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-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * * * *
UTAH HOTEL COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff & Appellant,
-vs-

Case No,. 17612

R. MILTON YORGASON, in his
official capacity as Salt
Lake County Assessor; and
WILLIAM E. DUNN, ROBERT G.
SALTER, WILLIAM L. HUTCHINSON,
each in their official
capacities as members of the
Board of Equalization for
Salt Lake County,
Defendants &
Respondents

* * * * * * * * * *
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT

* * * * * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the lower
court dismissing Appellant's Amended Petition for
Extraordinary Writ with prejudice.

Appellant, Hotel Utah

Company, filed an Amended Petition for Extraordinary Writ in
the District Court of Salt Lake County seeking to preclude
the Salt Lake County Assessor from appropriately valuing

1
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Appellant's property for the year 1980 and requiring Salt
Lake County to accept the 1978 value for Appellant's property as established by the State Tax Commission of Utah
an informal hearing.

~

The initial action filed by the

Appellant was filed with the Court even prior to the date
that Appellant made an administrative appeal from the

dee~

sion of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization.
Appellant,

in the manner in which it has attempted to

posture the case presently before the Court,

is seeking to

avoid any inquiry into the current value of its property
and, in effect, asserts that the value for the year 1978 is
the value for all subsequent years.

Respondent, County

Assessor and County Board of Equalization assert that theR
is an affirmative statutory duty to value all properties
within the County at its value as of January 1, 12:00 noon
of each year and that the statute that Appellant, Hotel Utah
Company relies upon to preclude the fulfillment of this statutory duty relates only to county-wide reappraisal under
the direction of the State Tax Commission of Utah and accordingly moved to dismiss Appellant's Amended Petition for
Extraordinary Writ, which Motion was granted by the trial
court.

2
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted Respondents Motion to
Dismiss Appellant's Amended Petition for Extraordinary Writ
thereby confirming the affirmative duty placed upon the
Assessor to value all taxable property

within the County as

of January 1, 12:00 noon of each year.

The lower court also

dismissed Appellant's Amended Petition for Extraordinary
Writ on the grounds that the Appellant had failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a decision of this Court affirming
the decision of the trial court and thereby upholding the statutory duty of the assessor of each county to value and
assess all taxable property within the county as of January
1, 12:00 noon.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Hotel Utah Company, is a Utah corporation and is the owner of real property located within
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more particularly described
in Salt Lake County Assessor's records under serial numbers

3
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01-3023, 01-3024-001 and, 01-3024-002.

(T-136.)

Appellant's property was valued by Salt Lake Count:
for tax purposes,

for the year 1978, during the year 1978,
s~~

Appellant appealed the 1978 valuation to the
Tax Commission.

The value of Appellant's property for tax

year 1978 was adjusted by a decision of the State Tax
Commission of Utah.

(T-136.)

The decisions of the Tax Commission specifically
limited their applicability to tax year 1978.

(T-24-25,)

During tax year 1980, the Salt Lake County Assessor
determined Appellant's valuation for tax year 1980.

That

valuation was appealed to the County Board of Equalizatioo.
That Board, after consideration of Appellant's appeal,
upheld the 1980 valuation by the Salt Lake County Assessor.
The Appellant then appealed the decision of the Salt

La~

Board of Equalization to the State Tax Commission of Utah.
Appellant's appeal of the 1980 valuation is still pending
before the State Tax Commission of Utah.

(T-136.)

Appellant filed its Petition for Extraordinary Writ
with the Court nearly two months prior to appealing to the
State Tax Commission.

(T-2-32 and T-98-103.)

In their petition to the Court, Appellants sought
to require Salt Lake County to use the same value in 1980
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that was used two years earlier in 1978.

(T-2-32 and

T-62-94.)
No where in Appellant's petition is there any evidence of 1980 valuation.

The only evidence as to 1980

valuation are the assessor's assessments and the decisions
of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization.

(T-27-30 and

T-91-94.)
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting
that the Court was without jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action because Appellant had failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies; that Appellant was required, as
a condition precedent to bringing the action, to pay the
taxes under protest and file a claim for refund; and that
the remedies sought by Appellant were specifically prohibited by Section 59-11-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended.

Respondent, County, in its Memorandum in Support

of its Motion to Dismiss also contended that Appellant's
reliance upon Section 59-5-109, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended was misplaced because the statute did not apply
to this particular case.

Respondents asserted that while

said statutory provision was passed by the Legislature for
purposes of equalizing values between and among the various
counties of the State of Utah, it did not conflict with or

5
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limit the ongoing statutory duty and obligation of the
Assessor set forth in Section 59-5-4, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, to assess property located within the
county to its owner at its value as of 12: 00 noon the first
day of January of the year in which the assessment was made,
(T-137,)
The trial court concluded that Section 59-5-109(2),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, was passed by the
legislature specifically for the purpose of equalizing
values between and among the various counties of the State oi
Utah and therefore did not preclude the assessor of each
county from valuing properties within the county on an
annual basis as of January 1 of each year and assessing
current property taxes against those properties.

The Court

further concluded that Section 59-5-109(2), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, did not require Salt Lake
County to use the Tax Commission decision as to value for
the year 1978 as the value of Appellant's property two years
later for tax year 1980.

(T-137,)

The Court thereupon dismissed Appellant's petition
with prejudice in so far as it sought to limit the
Assessor's legal capacity to value property on an annual
basis.

(T-137.)

6
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COUNTY ASSESSOR IS REQUIRED BY LAW TO VALUE ALL
TAXABLE PROPERTY WITHIN THE COUNTY AT ITS VALUE AS
OF THE FIRST DAY OF JANUARY OF EACH YEAR.
Section 59-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, was first enacted in 1898.
in effect for more than 82 years.

That statute has been
While there have been

some modifications of the 1898 statute, the language relative to the assessor's duty concerning annual valuation has
remained unchanged since the original enactment.
In said statute, the assessor's annual statutory
duty is to:
" •.. ascertain the names of all taxable inhabitants
and all property in the county subject to taxation
except such as is required to be assessed by the
State Tax Commission and must assess such property
to the person by whom it was owned or claimed, or
in whose possession or control it was, at 12
o'clock m. of the 1st day of January next preceeding, and at its value on that date; •••• "
(Emphasis supplied.) Section 59-5-4, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The same statute further charges assessors with
the duty to:
" ••• become fully acquainted with all property in
their respective counties, and are required to
visit each separate district or precinct either in
person or by deputy, annually, and in person or by
deputy annually to inspect the ~roperty.they are
required to assess ... "
(Emphasis supplied.)

7
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The above and foregoing language was in the statute
71 years prior to the time that the section relied upon by
Appellant, was enacted.

t

Similarly, the above statute was

reaffirmed by the 1981 legislature.

See Sections 59-5-4 anc

59-5-109, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Respondent has found no Utah case interpreting the
underlined portion of the annual valuation statute cited
above.

Perhaps the language of the statute relative to

annual valuation is so clear in its expressed terms, that no
need for interpretation exists.

The Supreme Court of

Arizona, confronting similar statutory language had this

~

say:
" ••• since the full cash value of all property shall
be determined yearly, the statute contemplates that
valuations may change from time to time and that
county assessors are directed to make these chan~s
yearly as circumstances demand. Security
Properties v. Arizona Department of Property
Valuation, 537 P. 2d 924 (Ariz. 1975) at page 926.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Court in reaching its decision in the above
case referred to the case of Transamerica Development Co. v.
County of Maricopa, 489 P. 2d 33 (Ariz. 1971) wherein a sta·
tement was made that should dispose of this case:
"While there may be some evidentiary value in pre·
vious valuation for purposes of arriving at full
cash value, the assessment must be considered on a
year-to-year basis, and the previous year's
valuation is not controlling."
489 P.2d at 36.
(Emphasis supplied.)

8
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Appellant,

in the instant case wants this Court to

foreclose any possible inquiry into Appellant's current
value.

It wants previous year's values to be controlling.

It wants this Court to say:
inquiry.

Why is this so?

1978 equals 1980--end of
Appellant wants to force Salt

Lake County to accept in perpetuity a 1978 decision of the
Tax Commission after an informal conference.

Respondents

don't even know why the Tax Commission reduced the
Appellant's value for that year.

A review of the Tax

Commission's decisions affecting Appellant's property makes
reference to " ••. taxation purposes for the year 1978."
(T-24-25).

The decisions of the Tax Commission do not say

for all subsequent years.

The decisions of the Tax

Commission do not say for the year 1980.
cally limited to 1978.

They are specifi-

Further reference to those decisions

will show that one decision was reached " ••• in lieu of an
informal hearing •.• "
ment is given.
is cited.

(T-24)

No explanation for the adjust-

No findings are made.

No specific evidence

In fact, Salt Lake County, after learning of the

extent of the adjustment made to Appellant's property,
endeavored to learn the basis for the decision.

One indica-

tion is that the income approach to valuation was used and

9
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since the Hotel Utah had finished a multi-million dollar
expansion project during the year 1978,
full occupancy.
tedly given.

it was not up to

A discounted rate of occupancy was

purpo~

However, by 1980 the Hotel was considered

~

be at full or near full capacity, contrary to the situation
in 1978, thereby necessitating a removal of the discount anc
corresponding increase in value.

(T-124).

The situation confronting Salt Lake County in 1978
was similar to what was confronting Maricopa County Arizona
in Security Properties v. Arizona Department of Property
Valuation, Supra.

The Assessor in that case testified that

they n ••• were attempting to correct errors,n meaning the
errors which had occurred in the statewide revaluation
program ••• "

537 P. 2d at page 926.

revalued in 1978.

Over 200, 000 separate parcels of property

existed at that time.
the year.

Salt Lake County was

There were over 8, 000 appeals during

Obviously the County could not ascertain the

accuracy of all assessments during that year.

In 1980 when

the assessor learned of the apparent discrepancy in the
current value of the Hotel Utah property, he undertook W
correct it.

Not only is this good assessment practice, but

it is action that was contemplated by the legislature of
this state when it enacted Section 59-11-3, Utah Code

10
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Annotated, 1953, as amended, which provides:
"Omissions, errors or defects in form in the
Assessment book, when it can be ascertained
therefrom what was intended, may, with the consent
of the county commissioners, be supplied or
corrected by the Assessor at anytime prior to sale
for delinquent taxes and after the original
assessment was made."
In addition, the assessor must certify under oath
that he has allowed no one to escape a " ••• just and equal
assessment ••• "
amended.

See 59-5-30 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as

If he permits underassessment to occur, he and his

sureties are subject to suit by the county attorney.
Section 59-5-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
And, the value of property underassessed being shown
requires a judgment to be entered for the amount of
uncollected taxes.

See Section 59-5-36, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended.
A reasonable review of the above statutes clearly
demonstrateds an intention on the part of the legislature to
impose an affirmative duty upon each assessor to vigilantly
maintain correct values on the assessment rolls.
choice.

See also, Baker v. Tax Commission, 520 P. 2d 203

(Utah, 1974),
change.

He has no

Tax year 1980 is not tax year 1978.

Conditions change.

Circumstances change.

Facts
As was

stated by the Supreme Court of Oregon:

11
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" ••• The interval between the transaction in the
subject property sought to be introduced and the
assessment date may be so great that it can be saic
as a matter of law that there was a change in conditions.
However, where this determination cann~
be made as a matter of law, reference must be made
to the underlying conditions affecting value befor,
such evidence can be rejected." Sabin v.
·
Department of Revenue, 528 P. 2d 69 (Oregon, 1974)
at page 71.
In that case, the Plaintiff's value
In that case, the Plaintiff's value had risen dra·
matically.

The area in which it was located had changed

from low density suburban commercial area to the site of two
shopping centers.

Plaintiff contested the current value

asserting that the 1969 purchase price he paid for the sub·
ject property was controlling for the year 1971.

The Court

rejected his argument, reasoning:
" ••• The evidence was conclusive that prices in the
area of the subject property rose dramatically bet·
ween 1969 and the assessment date because of a fun·
damental change in the use of the land in the area.
This rapid change in the basic condition affecting
value rendered the 1969 purchase sufficiently
remote to warrant its rejection."
The Hotel Utah property,

in part,

street from the Crossroads Shopping Mall.
there in 1978.

It was there in 1980.

affect on values?

is across the
The Mall was not

Did it have any

Certainly it should be a factor in

Appellant's 1980 valuation.

In Sabin, supra., the Court

rejected a purchase of the subject property as fixing ilie
value because it occurred two years prior to the current

12
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assessment date.

This Court should also reject Appellant's

1978 value as being the 1980 value.

Particularly is this

required when, as in this case, there is absolutely no
evidence to controvert the assessor's 1980 valuation as
affirmed by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization.
There is no factual basis upon which this Court could
justify judicial intervention into the area of taxation.

A

mere difference of opinion as to the method to be used in
computing valuation does not justify intervention.

Pima

County v. Cypress-Pima Mining Co., 579 P. 2d 1081 (Ariz.
1978).

See also Caldwell v. Department of Revenue, 596 P.

2d 45 (Ariz. 1979) where the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld
an assessment based upon the statutory presumption that an
assessment is correct and lawful in the absence of sufficient evidence to establish a different value.
Some cases go so far as to say that a person
challenging an assessment procedure must show systematic and
intentional conduct deliberately creating inequality before
judicial intervention will be allowed.

See Xerox Corp. v.

ADA County Assessor, 609 P. 2d 1129 (Idaho, 1980).
Section 59-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
and the other statutes cited above clearly establish the
obligation on the part of the assessor to value property as

13
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of January 1 of each year.

This will insure that all pro-

perties are valued on an annual basis and thereby carry oot
the constitutional mandate of uniformity.
statutes support this principle.
also support this position.

The applicable

The case law cited abow

The trial court's ruling

currently insures that these principles will be followed.
Appellant's should not be allowed to preclude inquiry

in~

the value of its property for the year 1980 or any other
year that inquiry is justified.

The decision of the Trial

Court was correct and should be affirmed.

POINT II
SECTION 59-5-109, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS
AMENDED, 1979, APPLIES TO THE STATE-WIDE
RE-APPRAISAL PROGRAM AND NOT AS A RESTRICTION OR
LIMITATION UPON THE ASSESSOR'S ANNUAL DUTY TO
APPRAISE PROPERTY AS OF JANUARY 1, 12:00 NOON.
Appellant, Hotel Utah's entire case is based upon
two misconceptions.
The first misconception is that the law governi~
the manner in which the Tax Commission administers the reappraisal program for the entire State of Utah affects the
miriad of statutes dealing with the assessment of properey
within each county.
The second misconception that the appellant has is
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that the word "valuation" as used in the various assessment
statutes means the same as the word "level".
Reviewing the title of Section 59-5-109, Utah Code
Annotated, as amended, 1979, reveals that the statute
addresses the following subject:

Revaluation of

property--Tax commission to administer--Procedure--Statecounty agreements--Record systems--Programs to be
successive--Apportionment of expense--Reimbursement by
counties--Disposition.
As can be seen by the various subjects set forth in
the heading of the statute, that statute covers the administration of the state-wide, county by county, cyclical reappraisal program set up by the State Legislature in 1969.
See Harmer v. State Tax Commission, 452 P. 2d 876 (Utah,
1969) relating to the same duty under earlier statutes.
The statute is located in the section of the Tax
Code under the heading "Administration of Property Tax
Assessments."

Subsection 2 of that statute, the one relied

upon by Appellant speaks in terms of "taxable real properties revalued, as provided in this chapter •••• "

And, sub-

section 3 also relied upon by Appellant reads in part as
follows:

"All properties added to the tax rolls after

January 1, 1978, in counties reappraised by the Tax

15
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Commission on or after January 1, 1978 •..• "

(Emphasis

supplied.)
As can be seen from both provisions, the statute
relates to the situation wherein the State Tax
Utah is conducting its reappraisal program.

Commissi~~

The statute

~

the subsections referred to above in no way relate to the
annual duty of the various assessors in the various counties
to assess property at its value as of January 1, 12:00 Nooo
to its owner.

If the Legislature had intended the

reappraisal statute to so apply, it would have amended the
various statutes set forth in Argument I of Respondents
brief.

However, rather than amend out the annual appraisal

obligation it, in fact, reaffirmed that obligation in 1981
when it amended 59-5-4 and left in the annual valuation
requirement.
amended, 1981.

See 59-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
As this Court has stated on previous

occasions:
" ••• one of the fundamental rules of statutory
construction is that the statute should be looked
at as a whole and in the light of the general purpose it was intended to serve; and, should be ~
interpreted and applied as to accomplish that
objective. In order to give the statute the imple·
mentation which will fulfill its purpose, reason
and intention sometimes prevail over technically
applied literalness." Andrus v. Allred, 404 P. 2d
972 (Utah, 1965) at P. 974.
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Applying this principle of statutory construction
to the statute relied upon by Appellant as limiting the
assessor's authority, will clearly demonstrate to this Court
that the limitations relied upon by the appellant apply to
the situation when the State Tax Commission is reappraising
an entire county and relates to the equalization process
among the several counties of the State of Utah and, in no
way relates to the processes within each respective county,
It allows county-wide adjustment so that one county is not
paying another county's share of the tax.
Appellant, in their brief, equates the phrase
"assessment level" with the word "valuation".

Respondent

would respectfully submit that the words do not have the
same meaning.

The Legislature has defined "value" in

Section 59-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, subsection (5) which reads as follows:

"Value" and "full cash

value" mean the amount at which the property would be taken
in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor.

That

is what is meant by value as it relates to property taxation.

While it is admitted that there is no statutory defi-

nition of "assessment level," respondent would assert that
the phrase "assessment level" relates to reappraisal and
results from the sales ratio studies conducted on an annual
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basis by the State Tax Commission of Utah to ascertain

t~

correlation between assessed value and actual market value
within the various counties and to then determine the
assessment level of each county as they relate to market
value and as they relate to each other.

Again, the concept

of assessment level addresses the question of equalizatioo
among the various counties, as implemented by the State Tu
Commission, and in no way relates to individual properties
within each county and the appraisal thereof by the
Assessor.

Co~~

The phrase, "level of assessment" then relates

more to a class or grouping of properties rather than indi·
vidual properties as is involved in the instant case.

See

Security Properties v. Arizona Department of Property
Valuation, 537 P. 2d 924 (Ariz. 1975).
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the
Appellant's reliance upon Section 59-5-109 as limiting the
Assessor's ability to correct a previously underassessed
property is not justified.

The statute in question rela~s

only to the reappraisal program conducted by the State Tax
Commission of Utah and not to the individual valuation duty
imposed upon the Assessor.

That this misplaced relian~

results, in part, from a failure to recognize that the words
"value" and "assessed value" have a different meaning than
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the word "assessment level."

And, even assuming arguendo

that the Plaintiff-Appellant's interpretation were correct,
a current valuation rolled back to 1978 may very well result
in a different valuation than the 1978 value.

There are

other factors that can affect the market place relating to
the value of a particular property other than inflation.
Such as the addition of a new shopping mall or restrictions
on the ability to build any more high-rise hotels or, the
availability of competitive financing.

All of these factors

could have an affect upon the value of a property in 1980
which, when rolled back to the 1978 value to remove the
affects of inflation, could result in a substantially different value than the value was,

in fact,

in 1980.

Therefore, under no circumstance could an argument be made
that the 1980 value, even rolled back, would necessarily be
the same as the 1978 value.

Since the only evidence before

the Trial Court for the year 1980 is the county's valuation,
this Court should sustain that Court's decision.

CONCLUSION
Respondent, Salt Lake County, respectfully submits
that the Trial Court correctly applied the law applicable to
this case and upheld the statutory duty of the County
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Assessor to appraise properties to their owners, at their
value, as of January 1, 12:00 Noon.

And, further concluded

that Section 59-S·-109 did not act as a limitation or impede·
ment to this annual statutory duty but, applied to the
reappraisal of the State of Utah by the State Tax Commission
when it was conducting its reappraisal program on a county
by county basis.

Additionally, the only evidence in the

record relative to 1980 value are the values set by Salt
Lake County.

This Court should not substitute its

judgm~

for that of the taxing authorities in the absence of competent evidence.

It is therefore, respectfully submitted

that the decision of the Trial Court should be affirmed in
all respects.
DATED this 2nd day of November, 1981.
THEODORE L. CANNON

LI.; T OMA
Special Deputy County Attorn<
Attorneys for Defendants
TIBBALS, ADAMSON, PETERS & Hf'.
220 South 200 East, Suite #!i
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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